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ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This thesis explores alternative organizational designs to improve 1st Marine Division's engineer
reconnaissance capability. It defines engineer reconnaissance as a complementary component of the
divisions decentralized reconnaissance function, and addresses the evolution of engineer
reconnaissance and its relevence to current and future maneuver commanders. This thesis expands
on current deficiencies in training, organization, and coordination to define the engineer
reconnaissance deficiency in terms of an organizational design problem. Four alternative solutions
are proposed to develop and maintain an improved engineer reconnaissance core competency
involving both structural and training changes. This thesis evaluates each alternative by three cost
criteria (personnel, training, and lateral coordination requirements), and four benefit criteria
(quality, acceptability, applicability, and maintainability) using an additive weighting and ranking
method of analysis to determine an optimal course of action. Results of this analysis suggest that
creating an engineer reconnaissance section at 1st Combat Engineer Battalion will provide the
greatest engineer reconnaissance benefit to the division at the lowest cost.
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This thesis explores alternative organizational designs to improve 1st Marine
Division's engineer reconnaissance capability. It defines engineer reconnaissance as a
complementary component of the divisions decentralized reconnaissance function, and
addresses the evolution of engineer reconnaissance and its relevence to current and
future maneuver commanders. This thesis expands on current deficiencies in training,
organization, and coordination to define the engineer reconnaissance deficiency in
terms of an organizational design problem. Four alternative solutions are proposed to
develop and maintain an improved engineer reconnaissance core competency involving
both structural and training changes. This thesis evaluates each alternative by three
cost criteria (personnel, training, and lateral coordination requirements), and four
benefit criteria (quality, acceptability, applicability, and maintainability) using an
additive weighting and ranking method of analysis to determine an optimal course of
action. Results of this analysis suggest that creating an engineer reconnaissance section
at 1st Combat Engineer Battalion will provide the greatest engineer reconnaissance
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Desert Shield and Desert Storm identified a deficiency in the U.S. Marine Corps
ability to conduct close and deep engineer reconnaissance missions. Neither combat
engineers nor reconnaissance Marines had the proper training or experience to conduct
engineer reconnaissance missions to gather information on Iraqi obstacle belts and
defensive measures. First Marine Division solved this particular problem by attaching
specially trained Marines from 1 st Combat Engineer Battalion (1 st CEB) to established
teams in 1
st
Reconnaissance Battalion. These composite reconnaissance teams trained for
approximately six weeks prior to insertion into Kuwait to gather vital information for 1 st
Marine Division Commanders. This solution required an inordinate amount of
preparation to develop the desired levels of proficiency in the engineer reconnaissance
skills necessary to conduct these missions. Future adversaries and environments may not
provide Marines with this preparation time, suggesting that the Marine combat engineer
and reconnaissance communities develop and maintain a readily employable engineer
reconnaissance capability.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis will address how to develop and maintain an engineer reconnaissance
capability in 1
st
Marine Division capable of operating across the geographic depth of the
battlefield. It will investigate potential alternative solutions to the current deficiency and
evaluate the relative costs and benefits of each alternative to yield a recommended course
of action. The primary research question addressed by this thesis is what alternative
organizational designs and training solutions provide 1
st
Marine Division with the best
1
engineer reconnaissance capability? In answering this primary research question, this
thesis also addresses the following subsidiary questions:
1
.
What is engineer reconnaissance and how does it fit into the division's
reconnaissance function?
2. Why does 1 st Marine Division require this capability?
3. What are the current engineer reconnaissance capabilities and limitations?
4. Which alternative provides the greatest benefit at the lowest cost?
C. ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis assumes that engineer reconnaissance is part of the division's
reconnaissance function. While engineer reconnaissance differs significantly from
amphibious and armored reconnaissance in some of the information collected, it shares
many of the methods of collection and means of employment across the geographic depth
of the battlefield.
This thesis assumes that increases in personnel strength in any one organization in
the Marine Corps will require a corresponding decrease in personnel strength from
another organization within the Marine Corps. Like all organizations, the Marine Corps
and 1 st Marine Division must allocate a finite pool of resources among its operating and
supporting structures. This becomes important when discussing any organizational
design changes involving personnel. The recent drawdown in personnel and operating
forces suggests that any organizational changes will be at best a "zero-sum" game.
Specifically, any personnel increases within the division or a subordinate reconnaissance
organization will be at the expense of another organization within or outside of 1 st Marine
Division.
This thesis also assumes that 1
st
Marine Division will absorb the current
distribution of reconnaissance assets at the regimental level into a new division level
reconnaissance organization. This may entail a re-emergence of the 1 st Reconnaissance
Battalion, or a new organization incorporating both division and MEF level
reconnaissance assets (Anderson, 1997). Lacking a final decision on reconnaissance force
structure and organization, this thesis uses the organization, mission and training plans of
the current Division Reconnaissance Company and Light Armored Reconnaissance
(LAR) Battalions as the organizations responsible for ground reconnaissance in 1st
Marine Division.
D. METHODOLOGY
The following methodology was used in preparation of this thesis:
1
.
Data collection involved a comprehensive review of military journals,
magazine articles, field manuals, mission statements and training plans for
selected 1
st Marine Division organizations, and reference materials from
engineer reconnaissance files maintained at 1 st CEB. Six interviews were
conducted with Marines experienced in combat engineer and reconnaissance
operations, of which two were used as direct references.
2. Alternative solutions were developed from both existing and new proposals
addressing engineer reconnaissance.
3. Alternative solutions were evaluated using an additive weighting and ranking
form of cost/benefit analysis. Evaluation criteria were established and
measured by their relative importance to the alternative solutions presented.
An optimal solution was selected from the alternatives by determining the
lowest of the alternatives cost-to-benefit ratios.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II provides necessary background information on engineer
reconnaissance. The chapter addresses engineer reconnaissance as part of 1 st Marine
Divisions reconnaissance function, and defines engineer reconnaissance in terms of the
tasks entailed and the knowledge and skill sets it requires. Chapter II reviews the
requirement for engineer reconnaissance, discusses current capabilities and limitations of
various reconnaissance organizations, and reviews the development of engineer
reconnaissance doctrine.
Chapter III defines the engineer reconnaissance problem in organizational design
terms. This includes the concepts of organizational core competencies, centers of gravity
and related diversification, task uncertainty and information requirements, and inter-
organizational coordination requirements.
Chapter IV develops four potential alternative solutions involving structural
changes to existing organizations, creation ofnew organizations, and improved cross
training between existing organizations.
Chapter V establishes cost and benefit evaluation criteria and analyzes the
alternatives developed in chapter IV. It identifies relative strengths and weaknesses
associated with each alternative and ranks the alternatives in terms of their cost-to-benefit
ratios.
Chapter VI discusses some conclusions and limitations of the thesis, and provides
recommendations and suggestions for further study.
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II. OVERVIEW OF ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter frames engineer reconnaissance as a complementary component of
the 1
st Marine Division's decentralized reconnaissance function. The chapter defines
engineer reconnaissance as part of this function, and addresses the historical, current and
projected future requirements for maintaining a readily employable engineer
reconnaissance capability. This definition differentiates engineer reconnaissance from
traditional reconnaissance functions conducted by divisional reconnaissance
organizations, specifically Division Reconnaissance Company, and 1 st and 3 rd LAR
Battalions. A review of current engineer reconnaissance capabilities within the division
highlights this functional difference and suggests some basic shortcomings in
organizational structure and training with respect to engineer reconnaissance. This
chapter concludes with a brief discussion of current engineer reconnaissance doctrine and
its reliance on inter-organization coordination for close and deep engineer reconnaissance
missions.
B. RECONNAISSANCE FUNCTIONS IN 1 st MARINE DIVISION
Reconnaissance is a decentralized function in 1 st Marine Division. Figure 2.1 is
an organizational chart illustrating the four distinct divisional organizations that are
formally tasked with portions of the reconnaissance function. The division commander
tasks each of these organizations with providing certain reconnaissance capabilities in
support of the division, a task-organized Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) such
as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), or a specific supported commander. First
Marine Division thus creates a division of labor for reconnaissance, tasking subordinate
5
units with particular types of reconnaissance that combine as the division's
reconnaissance function. The Division Reconnaissance Company and LAR Battalions
conduct primarily tactical reconnaissance while 1 st CEB conducts engineer
reconnaissance. While following sections address each organization's mission and


























Figure 2. 1 . 1
st
Marine Division Reconnaissance Organizations and Functions.
engineer reconnaissance as a complementary component of the division's reconnaissance
function as a whole. This understanding facilitates subsequent discussions of the
engineer reconnaissance function in 1 st Marine Division.
C. ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE DEFINED
Engineer reconnaissance is a function assigned to military engineer organizations
to collect information pursuant to planning or conducting operations. Military engineer
organizations further define this function as tasks which the organization must perform in
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order to complete its mission. All MAGTF combat engineer units include engineer
reconnaissance in their mission essential task list (METL). Types of engineer
reconnaissance differ between combat engineers in the ground combat element (GCE),
aviation combat element (ACE) and combat service support element (CSSE) based on
different engineer missions in support of each element. Engineer reconnaissance for the
GCE focuses on collecting data to support ground combat operations, while engineer
reconnaissance for the CSSE involves collecting data in support of combat service
support operations such as base camp construction, water point development, or
augmentation ofGCE combat engineers. Combat engineers assigned to the ACE focus on
collecting data in support of expeditionary airfield operations, forward arming and
refueling point (FARP) operations, and other aviation support missions. This research
focuses on the engineer reconnaissance mission of 1 st CEB in 1 st Marine Division, and
will define engineer reconnaissance within this context.
Given the variety of engineer reconnaissance functions in support of the MAGTF,
it is not surprising that current doctrinal publications do not adequately define or address
engineer reconnaissance. This is particularly true for engineer reconnaissance functions
in support of the GCE that focus on collecting information critical to ground maneuver
forces. Although doctrinal publications such as Field Manual (FM) 5-100 Engineer
Combat Operations address the importance of conducting engineer reconnaissance, they
fail to adequately define the term or its associated functions. Recognizing this
shortcoming, the U.S. Army Engineer School is currently drafting FM 5-170 Engineer
Reconnaissance to provide a common doctrinal basis for both U.S. Army and U.S.
Marine Corps combat engineer units tasked with conducting engineer reconnaissance.
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Excerpts from an untitled study by the BDM Corporation, a defense consulting
firm in Washington D.C., provided the best definition of engineer reconnaissance
encountered during the course of this research. The study addresses engineer functions in
support of the MAGTF and defines engineer reconnaissance as follows:
Thorough engineer reconnaissance is the primary tool used by
engineer elements at all echelons to maintain a current picture of the battle
field and may be performed in different degrees during all types of
military operations. Engineer reconnaissance within the zone of action is
a pre-planned and continuous operation performed by air or ground mobile
teams of engineers tasked to provide general or specific reconnaissance
based intelligence. Specific engineer reconnaissance tasks within a given
situation are determined by the current availability of accurate terrain
information and the developing tactical situation. Engineer
reconnaissance enables the commander to "see" the battlefield by
providing information or intelligence on obstacles, field fortifications,
camouflage, expected maneuver routes, area trafficability, and
hydrography, including locations and suitability of river crossing sites as
well as water point locations and stocks of engineer materials. (BDM
Corporation, p.II-7)
Given the lack of doctrinal guidance, 1 st CEB developed extensive SOPs
addressing its perceived role in conducting engineer reconnaissance. It defines its
engineer reconnaissance mission in terms of types of reconnaissance the battalion
must be able to conduct. A brief description of each type of reconnaissance
follows:
1 . Road reconnaissance - determining a road's trafficability by
conducting soil analysis (if not paved), determining surface
composition, roadway width, gradient, number of turn-around points,
and degrees of curvature.
2. Route Reconnaissance - collecting information on routes along the
axes of advance or withdrawal that may influence the commander's
plan.
3. Bridge Reconnaissance - determining a bridge's classification to
include type and length, load bearing capacity, estimation of required
repairs, and demolition requirements for its destruction.
4. Obstacle Reconnaissance - locating, recording, and possibly marking
all natural and man made obstacles and providing estimates of
breaching, spanning, or bypassing locations and requirements.
5. Tunnel Reconnaissance - determining critical dimensions,
trafficability, hasty repair requirements, and demolition requirements
for all types of tunnels.
6. Ford and Ferry Reconnaissance - locating possible ford and ferry sites,
determining depth of crossing, streambed materials, access and egress
routes, bank configuration, and water flow velocity.
7. Threat Engineer Reconnaissance - identifying and evaluating threat
engineer forces, equipment, capabilities, and activity. (Virden, 1997)
(Sapp, 1995)
These tasks form the basis for engineer reconnaissance in 1 st CEB and 1 st
Marine Division. They are applicable in varying degrees to both offensive and
defensive operations, which existing 1 st CEB reconnaissance proposals and SOPs
by Chief Warrant Officer Virden (1997) and Major Sapp (1995) address at length.
D. REQUIREMENT FOR ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE
Success in combat is heavily reliant on warfighters having required information
available in sufficient time to plan and execute combat operations. Engineer
reconnaissance has played a vital role in past conflicts, and is essential to current and
future conflicts and war plans, as well.
1. Historical Requirement
The requirement for engineer reconnaissance in support of ground combat forces
has significant historical precedent. Combat engineers have identified and breached
obstacles for advancing American forces since the Revolutionary War. Sapp's 1996
paper outlining the importance of engineer functions in operational maneuver from the
sea makes reference to General George Washington's general orders from 1779: "On a
march, in the vicinity of an enemy, a detachment of miners and sappers (combat
engineers) shall be stationed at the head of the column, directly after the vanguard for the
purpose of opening and mending roads and removing obstacles"(Sapp, p.l, 1996).
This statement alludes to the importance of conducting obstacle reconnaissance in
offensive operations and forms the basis for current obstacle breaching doctrine.
Engineer reconnaissance played a vital role during World War II and the Korean
War, as well. In 1944 United States Army combat engineers reconnoitered and breached
German minefields on D-Day in support of advancing allied forces (Turque and
Wilkinson, 1 99 1 ). During the Korean War, bridge reconnaissance missions conducted by
1
st
Marine Division allowed Marine forces to span a critical bridge at Koto-ri destroyed
by enemy sappers. This action was instrumental in the Marines tactical withdrawal from
the Chosin Reservoir (Montross and Canzona, 1957).
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In 1982 9th Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) recognized the need for timely and
detailed engineer intelligence in support of III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF,
predecessor to III Marine Expeditionary Force). To meet this requirement 9th ESB
organized and briefly maintained an Engineer Intelligence Platoon (EIP) to conduct
engineer reconnaissance and augment the III MAF intelligence collection capability. For
nearly four years the platoon participated in numerous III MAF exercises in the western
Pacific, and was noted for its performance conducting a detailed route reconnaissance in
South Korea during Team Spirit 84. Although the organization was disbanded in 1 986,
the EIPs brief success illustrated the engineer communities potential contribution to
Marine Corps reconnaissance (Motto, 1984).
A more recent and compelling need for an engineer reconnaissance capability was
illustrated by the 1 st Marine Divisions experience with Iraqi minefields and obstacles
during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Combat engineers from 1 st CEB conducted
reconnaissance patrols with Reconnaissance Marines from 1 st Reconnaissance Battalion
during Desert Shield to locate and identify minefields and other obstacles employed by
occupying Iraqi forces in Kuwait. These patrols provided critical intelligence for
commanders of U.S. Marine maneuver elements (Task Forces ((TF)) Ripper, Papa Bear,
Taro, and Grizzly) to plan and conduct combined arms breaching operations on the first
day of the ground war. First Combat Engineer Battalion's command chronology from
this period summarizes the importance of these actions to the Marines conducting the
breaches:
The best intelligence concerning the first obstacle belt was
delivered on 20-21 Feb 91 when Sgt Bell briefed the commanders of TF
Ripper and TF Papa Bear on the results of a patrol conducted by his recon
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team. His team traveled 20 kilometers into Kuwait and set up a hide
position from which they observed the minefield. He brought back the
details and descriptions badly needed by the assaulting forces, particularly
the engineers of the OCDs (Obstacle Clearing Detachments) (Kebelman,
1991).
Further comments by the 1 st CEB commander identify both the need for engineer
reconnaissance and the organizational and training implications of using combat
engineers in a reconnaissance role.
The value of including a combat engineer in the recon team could
never have been made more clear. This experience should serve not only
to solidify the relationship between the two disciplines, but to boost the
amount of reconnaissance training we conduct at 1 st CEB (Kebelman,
1991).
Studies conducted by the U.S. Army also validate the historic requirement for
engineer reconnaissance. Data collected in 1989 by the Army Research Institute at the
National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, showed that 75% of TFs that conducted
obstacle reconnaissance missions executed successful obstacle breaches. Conversely,
TFs that did not conduct obstacle reconnaissance executed far less effective breaching
efforts and often were stopped by the obstacle (Kula, 1992).
2. Current Requirement
The 1 st Marine Division Campaign Plan establishes a requirement for 1 st CEB to
maintain an engineer reconnaissance capability (Libutti, 1994). This is critical given 1 st
Marine Divisions regional areas of interest of Southwest Asia (SWA) and the Korean
Peninsula, both of which have Major Regional Conflict (MRC) contingency plans
associated with them. Iraq and Iran maintain large stocks of landmines and have
demonstrated their willingness to employ them in past conflicts (Watson, 1991). Both
North and South Korea have constructed and emplaced formidable obstacles in depth
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along the DMZ that pose serious mobility concerns to combat engineers and maneuver
commanders in 1 st Marine Division (Galloway, 1994). North Korea's very limited road
network, large number of bridges, and mountainous terrain pose additional mobility
concerns that combat engineer reconnaissance teams will have to assess in the event of
conflict. Each of these potential MRC threats would require a significant engineer
reconnaissance effort to insure the tactical mobility of l sl Marine Division maneuver
elements.
The lack of current map products for many countries of interest, including most
of the Third World, suggests a current and future requirement for engineer
reconnaissance. A 1989 study conducted by Robert Steele, the senior civilian consultant
with the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, determined that only ten of the Marine
Corps 69 countries of interest had complete 1 :50,000-scale map coverage. Most of that
coverage was dated by at least ten years, and did not reflect current road networks,
bridges, or airfields. As of 1992, most of Central America, SWA, Africa, and Asia still
had minimal 1 : 50,000 coverage. Commanders deployed to these areas will require
updated information on existing transportation infrastructure, which engineer
reconnaissance teams can provide (Steele, 1992).
3. Projected Future Requirement
In addition to operations plans for SWA and the Korean Peninsula, 1 st Marine
Division must be prepared to "...respond to crises across the operational continuum"
(Libutti, 1994, p. 2). This suggests capabilities applicable for responses ranging from
operations other than war, such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations, to
high intensity conflict. The proliferation of inexpensive, advanced technology landmines
13
among developing nations suggests an increasing probability of their employment in
regional conflicts (First Combat Engineer Battalion b, p. 7, 1996). This also poses tactical
mobility concerns to maneuver elements, which can be largely addressed through
improved engineer reconnaissance and breaching capabilities. A sound, rapidly
employable engineer reconnaissance capability will insure tactical mobility for 1 st Marine
Division in all environments.
E. CURRENT ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES AND
LIMITATIONS
This section addresses the engineer reconnaissance capabilities and limitations of
organizations tasked with conducting or supporting reconnaissance in 1 st Marine
Division. Each organization has specific core competencies that reflect their specific
mission in support of the division, and these core competencies help define their engineer
reconnaissance capabilities. Organizational theory (Mintzberg, 1996) suggests that
organizations concentrate on those core competencies that provide unique value to the
customer (in this case, 1
st
Marine Division). These core competencies become
instrumental in forming strategies to accomplish assigned missions.
1. First Combat Engineer Battalion
First Combat Engineer Battalion represents the primary body of engineer
knowledge and skill in 1 st Marine Division. This expertise focuses on mobility,
countermobility, survivability, and general engineering tasks and is reflected in the
battalion's METL (Battalion Mission Essential Task List, 1996). These are the core
competencies in which the battalion must excel in order to conduct it's mission to
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"...enhance the mobility, countermobility, and survivability of the (l sl ) Marine
Division...
,,(Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1992, p. 4-20).
Both the Division Campaign Plan and Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication
(FMFMRP) 1-11 Fleet Marine Force Organization task 1 st CEB with the engineer
reconnaissance mission. Given this mission 1 s CEB includes engineer reconnaissance as
one of the sub-critical tasks on the Battalion METL. Specifically, the battalion must be
able to "Conduct engineer reconnaissance and supporting intelligence collection within
the Division Area of Operations" (1
st CEB, METL, 1996).
First Combat Engineer Battalion's core competencies do not fully support this
mission, however. Combat Engineers are well-trained to conduct these missions in areas
under Division control (behind the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA)) or the Line
of Departure), but lack the training and formal structure to conduct independent close and
deep reconnaissance missions. Although strong in engineering skills, combat engineers
generally lack the advanced infantry skill training and experience associated with
reconnaissance organizations. While the battalion conducts some excellent basic engineer
reconnaissance training through its battalion schools program, it does not have a formal
reconnaissance organization staffed with trained "reconnaissance engineers" capable of
operating with other reconnaissance organizations in the division. Staffing priorities and
command interest impact developing a formal engineer reconnaissance organization at 1 st
CEB. Fluctuating manning levels in the line companies and the relatively small number
of Marines possessing the requisite skill and maturity of a reconnaissance engineer are
limiting factors in creating a formal engineer reconnaissance organization. Few battalion
commanders have a sufficient number of qualified Marines to provide both the leadership
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required in the line companies and staff a separate engineer reconnaissance organization
(Bell, 1997). Given this choice, most commanders assign a higher priority to manning
the line companies and are reluctant to give up their most qualified Marines to an internal
reconnaissance organization. To exacerbate this problem, battalion commanders turn
over approximately every two years. This results in relatively short periods of individual
command influence and a high degree of potential organizational change based on
different commander's goals and strategies.
2. 1
st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company
The 1 st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company's mission is to "...conduct
amphibious reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, and limited scale raids in support of
1
st
Marine Division and it's subordinate units." (Cunniffe, 1997, p. 2). Accordingly, the
company's METL lists specific reconnaissance tasks focused on enemy activity and other
tasks in support of division units. It lists the ability to ". . .collect other information of
military significance including specialized terrain reconnaissance," but makes no other
references to engineer reconnaissance. Captain Cunniffe's Mission Training Plan
(Cunniffe, 1997) suggests that the company's core competencies are centered on classic
reconnaissance tasks, and do not include engineer specific skills necessary to conduct
engineer reconnaissance. This supports the premise that Reconnaissance Marines are
well-trained and equipped to operate independently and collect tactical intelligence across
the geographic depth of the battlefield, but are not properly trained to collect engineer-
specific intelligence.
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3. Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalions
First Marine Division has two LAR Battalions; 1 st LAR at Camp Pendleton and
3
r LAR at Twentynine Palms. These battalions have similar missions, specifically "to
conduct reconnaissance, security, limited offensive and defensive operations, and other
operations as directed by the Division or supported commander" (3
rd LAR Bn, 1996).
Although capable of conducting both mounted and dismounted reconnaissance
operations, the LAR battalions typically focus on armored operations in mechanized
environments. Their METLs reflect this focus by including the ability to "conduct
reconnaissance operations to include reconnaissance in force, zone, area, and point
reconnaissance" as one of their prioritized tasks (3
rd LAR Bn, 1996). This suggests their
core competencies include armored and limited dismounted collection of tactical
intelligence from the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV)-25 platform. These organizations are
highly mobile across the geographic depth of the battlefield and provide the supported
commander with a range of reconnaissance capabilities that complement those of the
Division Reconnaissance Company.
The LAR battalion Tables of Organization (TO) include a combat engineer officer
as the assistant operations officer (S-3A), but do not have any additional combat engineer
line numbers. This billet provides the LAR battalions with a resident source of engineer
skills and knowledge, but does not provide an organic engineer reconnaissance
capability. When viewed as a staff liaison position this billet does promote cross-training
between LAR and CEB if the respective commanders provide command interest and
direction, and has served as the basis for developing past habitual supporting
relationships between the two organizations. While these positions promote some
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coordination between 1 st CEB and l st/3 rd LAR, they often are not staffed with a combat
engineer officer due to low manning levels or over-riding staffing priorities within 1 st
CEB. To summarize, the LAR battalions have some resident combat engineer expertise
but no true engineer reconnaissance capability without additional augmentation from 1 st
CEB.
F. ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE DOCTRINE
Engineer reconnaissance doctrine emerged from early amphibious and military
reconnaissance doctrine developed by the Marine Corps during World War II. While
reconnaissance organizations have detailed internal doctrine that governs training and
operations, engineer reconnaissance doctrine does not adequately address current and
future requirements for conducting engineer reconnaissance across the geographic depth
of the battlefield.
1. Development of Engineer Reconnaissance Doctrine
In his in-depth review of United States Marine Corps reconnaissance FMFRP 12-
21 AARUGHA!, Stubbe provides an interesting discussion of early reconnaissance
doctrine. This early doctrine, written by Marine Major Dion Williams in 1906, focused
heavily on engineer types of reconnaissance. William's divided Marine reconnaissance
into two types based on location; amphibious reconnaissance conducted up to the shore
and military reconnaissance of the beach and inland areas. Williams discussion of the
scope of military reconnaissance highlights the focus on engineer related information.
His concern with collecting information on
...configuration of the ground, cities, towns, roads, trails, railroads,
telegraph cables, telephone lines... rivers, canals, resources (coal, repair
18
facilities, land transportation, electric plants... water supply )...fieldworks,
mines and minefields... (Stubbe, 1989, p. 5)
reflects the heavy influence of typical engineer functions on reconnaissance doctrine.
Williams' description of the type of officer best-suited to oversee the military
portion of reconnaissance is particularly illuminating: "...a Marine officer who has had
practical experience in topographic work, the construction of semipermanent
fortifications and field works and in camping in the field should be assigned to cover that
part of the work" (Stubbe, 1989, p. 5). This description suggests a strong engineering
background combined with infantry skills, which is an apt description of current Marine
combat engineers. Williams' work clearly points to the strong engineer foundation of
early reconnaissance doctrine.
As Marine reconnaissance doctrine developed it became increasingly focused on
pre-assault beach reconnaissance and location of enemy forces, and lost much of
Williams' initial engineer-related basis. If a commander required specific engineer
reconnaissance information that exceeded the "hasty reconnaissance" capabilities of
Marines assigned to reconnaissance organizations, then doctrine specified attaching
"qualified" engineer specialists capable of operating as part of a reconnaissance team
(Marine Corps Institute, 1984). This shift forms the basis for current engineer
reconnaissance doctrine in 1 st Marine Division.
2. Current Engineer Reconnaissance Doctrine
Current doctrine relies on combat engineers augmenting divisional reconnaissance
organizations for conducting close and deep engineer reconnaissance missions. This is in
keeping with the Marine Corps method of task organizing forces to accomplish specific
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missions and assumes a large degree of interoperability (or coordination) between
organizations. Interoperability, however, requires a base level of skill standardization and
relies on regular interaction and cross training between organizations to develop
confidence and credibility. Chapter III addresses skill standardization as a coordinating
mechanism between organizations.
Cross training rarely (if ever) occurs between 1 st CEB and Division
Reconnaissance Company, largely due to demanding operational tempos and a lack of
command direction. Division Reconnaissance Company's training focuses almost
exclusively on preparing platoons for assignment to MEUs, which precludes their
participation in most non-MEU events (Smith, 1997).
Cross training occurs more frequently between l st/3 rd LAR and 1 st CEB, primarily
during major training exercises such as Combined Arms Exercises (CAXs) and other
battalion and regimental level events. These events provide exposure between
organizations, but fall short of the time and frequency required for members of one
organization to fully understand the others' SOPs and requirements.
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provided an overview of engineer reconnaissance and laid the
groundwork for understanding the engineer reconnaissance deficiency in 1 st Marine
Division. Historical precedent and current OPLANs involving 1 st Marine Division
validate the requirement for the division to maintain an engineer reconnaissance
capability. Various doctrinal publications and the 1 st Marine Division Campaign Plan
assign the engineer reconnaissance mission to 1
st CEB as part of the division's
reconnaissance function. A review of core competencies highlighted the difficulties
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faced by both 1 st CEB and division reconnaissance organizations in conducting close and
deep engineer reconnaissance missions. Doctrine does not adequately address how the
division can develop and maintain an engineer reconnaissance capability for employment
across the geographic depth of the battlefield. Despite a common early history, engineer
reconnaissance and tactical reconnaissance doctrine diverged and became proprietary to
separate organizations within the division. While 1 st Marine Divisions division of labor
with respect to reconnaissance promotes specialization at the subordinate organizational
level, adequate coordinating mechanisms do not exist to effectively integrate combat
engineers with division reconnaissance organizations to conduct close and deep engineer
reconnaissance missions.
In summary, 1 st Marine Division's engineer reconnaissance capability suffers
from insufficient integration into the division's reconnaissance function. Chapter III
defines and addresses the organizational design problem posed by improving engineer
reconnaissance in 1 st Marine Division.
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III. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter addresses the organizational design problem concerning engineer
reconnaissance in 1 st Marine Division. Chapter II viewed engineer reconnaissance as part
of the division's reconnaissance function and suggested two primary causal factors that
affected engineer reconnaissance capabilities. One, the lack of an effective engineer
reconnaissance core competency in any of the divisional reconnaissance organizations,
and two, limited coordination between the organizations tasked with conducting
reconnaissance for the division. The chapter addresses creating a core competency in
terms of unit grouping and organizational diversification, and describes the
organizational design problem in terms of differentiation and integration of
reconnaissance tasks that comprise the division's reconnaissance function. A discussion
of mechanisms that promote inter-organizational coordination identifies specific
reconnaissance coordination problems in 1 st Marine Division. The chapter concludes
with a definitive problem statement addressing the divisions engineer reconnaissance
deficiency.
B. CREATING A CORE COMPETENCY
Creating an engineer reconnaissance core competency within one of the
Division's reconnaissance organizations involves a degree of organizational
diversification. This section addresses creating core competencies in terms of unit
grouping, organizational centers of gravity, and organizational diversification.
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1. Unit Grouping
Creating a core competency may involve how individuals are grouped together
within an organization. Unit grouping is an organizational design parameter that
"...refers to the choice of the bases by which positions are grouped together into
units... "(Mintzberg, 1996, p. 335) and ultimately affects coordination and organizational
interdependencies. Specifically, unit grouping ". . .encourages coordination by putting
different jobs under common supervision, by requiring them to share common resources
and achieve common measures of performance, and by using proximity to facilitate
mutual adjustment among them"(Mintzberg, 1996, p. 335). Mintzberg identifies two
fundamental bases for grouping, by function and by market.
Grouping by function is usually preferable in organizations that have tightly
linked workflows (or interdependencies) requiring internal coordination, sharing of
common resources, and improvement of skills. Armored reconnaissance, stealth
reconnaissance and combat engineering are all functions within the division that promote
grouping individuals by function based on interdependencies within each functional
organization. As suggested by Chapter II, however, engineer reconnaissance as part of
the division reconnaissance function may create a process interdependence between
organizations within the division. This interdependence may promote grouping by
market at the division level, whereby units are grouped according to the entire process by
which a product or service is produced. For example, individuals or small elements from
two or more organizations within the division may be dependent upon one another to
conduct a specific type of reconnaissance (such as engineer reconnaissance). Given this,
grouping individuals by either the engineer or reconnaissance functions will promote
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specialization within each function but by itself does not contain the engineer
reconnaissance process interdependency. With respect to structuring units to conduct
various types of reconnaissance, this suggests that grouping by function is appropriate at
the battalion level while grouping by market is appropriate at the division level. The
division is currently organized in essentially this fashion.
2. Centers of Gravity and Related Diversification
First Combat Engineer Battalion, Division Reconnaissance Company, and l st/3rd
LAR Battalions all have strengths based on their specific core competencies and mission
requirements that create an organizational "center of gravity." Mintzberg (1996) defines
an organization's center of gravity as arising "...from the firm's initial success in the
industry in which it grew up" (Mintzberg, 1996, p. 323). First Combat Engineer
Battalion's center of gravity lies in its combat engineering skills and knowledge, which
equates specifically to mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering.
Division Reconnaissance Company's center of gravity lies in its ability to conduct ground
and amphibious reconnaissance, while l st/3 rd LAR Battalions center of gravity lie in
armored reconnaissance. By developing an engineer reconnaissance core competency,
either of these organizations could maintain its center of gravity but diversify into an
activity in a related functional area. Mintzberg (1996) describes this process as related
diversification, whereby an organization diversifies into a new, but related, functional
area while retaining its original center of gravity. This process allows the organization to
develop a diversified portfolio of capabilities while retaining a common command and
organizational structure.
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Creating a core competency at one of the divisions subordinate reconnaissance
organizations through related diversification may not completely solve the problem,
however. The division may have to employ this core competency as part of a
reconnaissance process, suggesting that interdependencies will still exist between
reconnaissance organizations. The remainder of this chapter addresses the importance of
coordination mechanisms to effectively employ an engineer reconnaissance core
competency.
C. TASK UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
Galbraith's (1973) treatment of the organizational design problem addresses how
task uncertainty and information requirements affect designing an organization. When
designing an organization to accomplish a specific task, he suggests that the effect of task
uncertainty on the information required to execute the task determines the design
framework. In this case, the organization is 1 st Marine Division, and the task is
conducting engineer reconnaissance. Galbraith defines uncertainty associated with a task
as ". . .the difference in the amount of information required to perform the task and the
amount of information already possessed by the organization" (Galbraith, 1973, p. 5). He
suggests that if "...the task is well understood prior to performing it, much of the activity
can be pre-planned" and that "the basic effect of uncertainty is to limit the ability of the
organization to preplan... activities in advance of their execution" (Galbraith, 1973, p. 4).
Chapter II described the roles of 1 st Marine Division's subordinate reconnaissance
organizations and suggested that their extensive SOPs imply a good understanding of
reconnaissance tasks. Applying Galbraith's argument to executing the engineer
reconnaissance task, uncertainty exists between rather than within the division's
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reconnaissance organizations. This supports the premise that V 1 Marine Division lacks
coordinating mechanisms to combine knowledge and skill sets resident in subordinate
reconnaissance organizations for successful task execution. The following section
discusses methods for achieving inter-organizational coordination between the division's
subordinate reconnaissance organizations.
D. INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION
This section discusses two types of coordination and some mechanisms to achieve
lateral coordination between an organization's subordinate elements. It addresses vertical
and lateral coordination as they relate to 1 st Marine Divisions reconnaissance function,
and introduces Galbraith's concept of applying lateral processes based on degrees of task
uncertainty and information requirements. The section concludes by discussing skill
standardization as an additional method of improving inter-organizational coordination.
1. Vertical and Lateral Coordination
Bolman and Deal (1991) address two primary means of achieving coordination
between elements in an organization; vertical coordination and lateral coordination.
Vertical coordination involves individuals at higher levels coordinating and controlling
subordinates activities through authority, planning, regulations, and established
procedures (Bolman and Deal, 1991). Most existing coordination measures for
reconnaissance are vertical in nature and exist within the division's subordinate




LAR Battalions, and 1 st CEB all have unit leaders, SOPs, and METLs that specifically
define reconnaissance tasks and processes within each organization. These exist at the
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division level, as well, but require lateral coordination mechanisms to promote effective
coordination between 1 st CEB and other reconnaissance organizations.
Lateral coordination mechanisms are generally more flexible, less formal, and
developed to fill coordination voids not addressed by vertical mechanisms. Galbraith
(1973) addresses several lateral mechanisms that organizations may apply to improve
coordination between subordinate elements or organizations. The three mechanisms
most applicable to the engineer reconnaissance problem are:
1
.
Direct contact between leaders sharing a common problem.
2. Establishing coordinating roles or liaison positions between organizations.
3. Creating temporary task forces to address specific problems or projects.
Galbraith recommends organizations apply these mechanisms sequentially and
cumulatively as uncertainty increases. For example, conducting certain close engineer
reconnaissance missions may involve a limited amount of uncertainty and only require
direct coordination between platoon commanders from 1st LAR and 1 st CEB. A more
complex, deep reconnaissance mission involving multiple organizations increases the
degree of uncertainty, however, and establishing sufficient coordination to execute the
task may require involvement of liaison officers or even a task force of personnel from
each organization.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the lateral coordination requirements between 1 st CEB, the
Division Reconnaissance Company and the LAR Battalions necessary to incorporate
engineer reconnaissance in the division reconnaissance function. Positioning of
organizational blocks in Figure 3.1 is not intended to suggest primacy of any one
organization, only that lateral coordination must occur between these organizations. The
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only "formal" lateral coordination mechanism currently in place to facilitate engineer
reconnaissance is the combat engineer officer billet at the LAR battalions. No similar








Figure 3.1. Lateral Coordination Requirements for Engineer Reconnaissance.
These concepts suggest that establishing a combination of vertical and lateral
coordination mechanisms within the division and between its subordinate reconnaissance
organizations would improve the division's engineer reconnaissance capability.
2. Skill Standardization
Mintzberg (1996) suggests standardization of skills as another method for
achieving coordination within and between organizations. This involves standardizing
the procedures followed by an operator rather than the product produced. Although each
reconnaissance organization standardizes reconnaissance skills within the particular
organization, the type of reconnaissance conducted, environment, and equipment often
limit inter-operability (or operational coordination) between organizations. This is
precisely the condition that exists between 1 st CEB and the Division Reconnaissance
Company, and to a lesser degree between 1 st CEB and the LAR battalions.
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First Combat Engineer Battalion standardizes engineer reconnaissance training
internally through the Sapper Leader Course. The battalion created this course to teach a
variety of combat engineer skills including engineer reconnaissance, advanced
demolitions, basic assault climbing, communications, land navigation, and basic
patrolling (1
st CEB, Sapper Leader Course SOP, 1996). The battalion receives few, if
any, quotas to the formal schools habitually attended by Reconnaissance Marines
(specifically the Basic Reconnaissance Course (BRC)) and developed the Sapper Leader
Course in part to improve its engineer reconnaissance capability. This school has
dramatically improved the battalions engineer reconnaissance capability, but most
students have no opportunity to habitually cross-train with Reconnaissance Marines to
maintain and improve their skills following graduation. This stems in part from the high
operational tempo (op tempo) within the battalion and division, and the lack of a
reconnaissance organization within 1
st CEB to facilitate training.
The Division Reconnaissance Company standardizes reconnaissance training
during an Individual Training Phase that makes use of both internal and external training
assets. This six-month period involves a series of formal and informal schools that
provide Marines with the basic skills they must master prior to operating as a member of
a reconnaissance team. The Individual Training Phase revolves around each member of
the organization completing the BRC that qualifies them as a 0321 Reconnaissance
Marine (Cunniffe, 1997) (Anderson, 1997). First Combat Engineer Battalion has
extremely limited access to BRC school quotas, resulting in very few combat engineers
qualified as 0321 Reconnaissance Marines. Similarly, 1 st CEB receives no quotas to
schools attended by LAR battalion scouts or the LAV Leaders Course designed to
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familiarize Marines with light armored operations and LAV variants. The reconnaissance
engineers could improve lateral coordination and interoperability with other
reconnaissance organizations by attending this and other reconnaissance-specific schools.
E. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND CHAPTER SUMMARY
The preceding sections outlined aspects of the organizational design problem
posed by improving the engineer reconnaissance capability of 1 st Marine Division.
Specifically, 1
st
Marine Division requires an engineer reconnaissance core competency
and effective coordination mechanisms among subordinate reconnaissance organizations
to improve integration of engineer reconnaissance into the division's reconnaissance
function. Creating this core competency at one of the existing reconnaissance
organizations will require some organizational diversification, ideally around an existing
center of gravity. Employing a core competency may require mechanisms to coordinate
various groups of knowledge and skill sets for effective task execution. Chapter IV






This chapter presents four alternative solutions to the engineer reconnaissance
problem as stated in Chapter III. The first alternative creates an engineer reconnaissance
core competency within 1 st CEB through structural modification, and involves training
and use of liaison roles to promote coordination with other reconnaissance organizations.
The second alternative creates an engineer reconnaissance core competency in the
Division Reconnaissance Company through structural modification but does not require
significant use of liaison roles. The third alternative creates an engineer reconnaissance
core competency in a new, hybrid light armored "Raider" organization that involves
significant structural and equipment modifications. The fourth alternative creates an
engineer reconnaissance capability in the division through cross training between existing
organizations.
B. ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE SECTION AT 1 st CEB
This alternative solution involves developing an engineer reconnaissance core
competency by designing an engineer reconnaissance element within 1 st CEB's existing
organization. The level of analysis focuses on this structural element relative to the
battalion and other reconnaissance organizations with which it must coordinate. Figure
4.1 depicts a formal engineer reconnaissance structure resident within 1
st CEB that must
coordinate not only internally but also with adjacent reconnaissance organizations. The









Figure 4.1. Coordination Requirements for an Engineer Reconnaissance Section
Within 1 st CEB.
Virden (1997) proposes developing an engineer reconnaissance section within 1 st
CEB. This proposal develops an engineer reconnaissance core competency within the
battalion capable of conducting independent engineer reconnaissance operations across
the geographic depth of the battlefield. These reconnaissance engineers would be
capable of independent operations in the close and rear battlefield areas that are under the
division's control. For deep engineer reconnaissance operations in areas not under the
division's control, this proposal requires task organizing reconnaissance engineers into
either a LAR unit or Division Reconnaissance Company team. Despite this task
organization requirement for deep reconnaissance, Virden' s proposal groups individuals
into a unit by the combat engineering function for training, administration, and most
employment purposes. While the battalion's center of gravity remains combat
engineering, creation of this engineer reconnaissance section involves a related
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diversification process into engineer reconnaissance. This requires combat engineers to
learn reconnaissance skills and procedures to coordinate with other divisional
reconnaissance organizations, thus introducing the training component of this solution.
Virden addresses this briefly and references a similar proposal by Sapp (1995)
that outlines training requirements in greater detail. Sapp cites the coordination and
interoperability requirement to justify his recommendation of reconnaissance engineers
attending many of the same schools that reconnaissance Marines attend during their
Individual Training Phase. This suggests that creation of an engineer reconnaissance
section must involve a training component to develop skill standardization for
coordination with other division reconnaissance organizations. The following sub-
sections identify personnel and training requirements associated with this alternative.
1. Personnel Requirements
Virden' s proposal forms the engineer reconnaissance section around the existing
Sapper School instructor cadre in 1 st CEB. The proposal recommends a section
composed of two six-man teams and a three-man headquarters (HQ) element as
illustrated in Table 4.1. The six-man team size mirrors the six-man size of a Division
Reconnaissance Company team and is compatible with LAR operations. This team size
also promotes coordination within 1 st CEB as it facilitates these Marines continuing to
conduct their Sapper School instructor duties. The inclusion of one 1141 Electrician
enhances each team's ability to evaluate power systems and power requirements at
enemy or friendly facilities of interest to the MAGTF. Virden suggests that a 1371
Gunnery Sergeant possesses the requisite "...grade and experience to coordinate with
adjacent units, provide guidance, and effectively manage a new program such as
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this"(Virden, 1997, p. 3). Virden specifically recommends permanently attaching the
3535 driver and 8404 corpsman to the section based on mission essential need. This
makes sense, given that normal Sapper School operations require corpsman and driver
support.














































Table 4.1. 1 st CEB Engineer Reconnaissance Section Personnel Requirements.
2. Training Requirements
Virden's proposal references an earlier proposal by Sapp (1995) with respect to
training requirements for Marines assigned to the engineer reconnaissance section. These
requirements focus primarily on developing reconnaissance skills through attendance at
formal schools in order to standardize skills for interoperability with other reconnaissance
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organizations. While Sapp proposed attendance at a plethora of reconnaissance-related
schools, Virden proposes a more realistic curriculum reflected in Table 4.2.
School Attended By
Basic Reconnaissance Course
Combat Water Survival School
Assault Climbers School





Team Leader/Assistant Team Leader
Table 4.2. Engineer Reconnaissance Section Formal School Requirements.
Virden acknowledges the requirement for basic reconnaissance skill
standardization but limits skills acquired to those most likely to be used by
reconnaissance engineers operating independently or with other reconnaissance
organizations. While skill standardization promotes coordination and interoperability at
the "operating core," liaison roles promote planning and employment coordination
between reconnaissance organizations.
3. Lateral Coordination Requirements
Any coordination between reconnaissance organizations will involve some form
of direct contact between unit leaders. This may take a variety of forms to include an
informal discussion of employment options or an initial planning conference. Marines
serving in liaison roles with adjacent organizations assist unit leaders with lateral
coordination by developing effective training and employment plans, and providing
organizational leaders with experience and expertise unique to their MOS. By
developing an engineer reconnaissance core competency within 1
st CEB, Virden's
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proposal benefits from the established combat engineer liaison position at 1 st/3 rd LAR
Battalions. Virden's proposal does not require any change in the liaison positions at the
LAR Battalions, only an increased use of them to coordinate engineer reconnaissance
section training and employment with light armored reconnaissance operations. Recent
training exercises such as the LAR community's Deep Maneuver Exercise included
engineer "scouts" from 1 st CEB and suggest an improvement in tapping the liaison officer
coordination resource.
Although not addressed by Virden or Sapp, creating a similar liaison position in
the operations section at the Division Reconnaissance Company would promote lateral
coordination with 1 st CEB. Assigning an appropriately qualified staff sergeant or
gunnery sergeant to this billet would fill the liaison requirement and provide the Division
Reconnaissance Company with an "in-house" source of combat engineering expertise to




Have a detailed knowledge of amphibious and ground reconnaissance
operations (ideally gained from previous experience working with
reconnaissance and combat engineer organizations).
2. Be an articulate proponent of the engineer reconnaissance sections capabilities
and limitations.
3. Add value to the Division Reconnaissance Company's Individual and Unit
Training Phases, particularly by providing instruction on landmine warfare,
demolition charges for specific targets, and booby-trap techniques.
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C. ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY AT DIVISION
RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
This alternative solution develops an engineer reconnaissance core competency
by assigning combat engineers to the Division Reconnaissance Company. This
alternative relieves 1
st CEB of the close and deep engineer reconnaissance missions by
consolidating them in the Division Reconnaissance Company. No existing proposals
address this alternative, which entails creating an engineer reconnaissance element within
the existing Division Reconnaissance Company organization. This alternative involves
grouping by function to create a core competency, although the functions differ slightly at
the platoon and company levels. Individuals are grouped together in the engineer platoon
by the engineer reconnaissance function while the engineer platoon is grouped into the
Division Reconnaissance Company by the divisions stealth reconnaissance function. The
Division Reconnaissance Company retains its reconnaissance center of gravity, while
diversifying into the related field of engineer reconnaissance.
Figure 4.2 depicts a hypothetical platoon-sized engineer reconnaissance element
subordinate to the Division Reconnaissance Company. This alternative internalizes most
coordination requirements for close and deep engineer reconnaissance within the
Division Reconnaissance Company, although certain missions may require coordination
with l st/3 rd LAR Battalions. This alternative effectively removes 1 st CEB from the
execution of close and deep engineer reconnaissance missions, but provides them with








Figure 4.2. Coordination Requirements for an Engineer Reconnaissance Platoon
Within the Division Reconnaissance Company.
1. Personnel Requirements
This engineer reconnaissance platoon may mirror the structure of a standard
reconnaissance platoon composed of a headquarters section and three six-man
reconnaissance teams. Table 4.3 depicts the personnel requirements by rank and billet.
The platoon commander's role warrants the rank of a senior lieutenant, preferably one
with previous experience as a platoon commander in 1 st CEB and a sound knowledge of
engineer reconnaissance requirements and techniques. Both the platoon commander and
platoon sergeant must be proficient in small unit tactics, infantry skills, and
reconnaissance techniques to maintain credibility in a reconnaissance organization. While
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the reconnaissance engineers must be dual qualified as both engineers and reconnaissance
Marines, they should ideally have served with a combat engineer line company prior to
Element Quantity Rank MOS Billet
HQ IstLt 1302 Platoon Commander
SSgt 1371/0369 Platoon Sergeant
Sgt/Cpl 1371/0321 Equipment NCO
Cpl 2531/0321 Field Radio Operator
HN 8404 Corpsman
Team 1 Sgt 1371/0369 Team Leader
Cpl 1371/0321 Asst. Team Leader
LCpl 1371/0321 Recon Engineer
LCpl 1141/0321 Recon Engineer
LCpl 1371/0321 Recon Engineer/Driver
Team 2 Sgt 1371/0369 Team Leader
Cpl 1371/0321 Asst. Team Leader
2 LCpl 1371/0321 Recon Engineer
LCpl 1141/0321 Recon Engineer
LCpl 1371/0321 Recon Engineer/Driver
Team 3 Sgt 1371/0369 Team Leader
Cpl 1371/0321 Asst. Team Leader
2 LCpl 1371/0321 Recon Engineer
LCpl 1141/0321 Recon Engineer
Total =
LCpl. 1371/0321 Recon Engineer/Driver
1/21/1
Table 4.3. Peirsonnel Requirements for Eilgineer Reconna issance Platoon at Division
Reconnaissance Company,
assignment to the reconnaissance platoon. This ensures that only qualified Marines with




Prior to this assignment to the Division Reconnaissance Company, combat
engineers should attend 1
st CEBs Sapper Leader Course (or an equivalent school) to
develop the engineer-specific reconnaissance expertise and skill sets required to
effectively conduct engineer reconnaissance operations. Once assigned, internal skill
standardization requirements within the company would require that combat engineers
assigned to the reconnaissance platoon complete the company's individual training phase
mentioned in Chapter III. Table 4.4 lists specific school requirements and the required
number of students for the proposed engineer reconnaissance platoon.
Upon completion of the individual training phase, the engineer reconnaissance
platoon would conduct unit training similar to that conducted by reconnaissance platoons
in the unit training phase. This phase. . . "develop(s) the platoon into a cohesive unit with
fully established SOPs and trained to accomplish the company's METL" (Cunniffe,
Enclosure 3, 1997). Actual employment of the engineer reconnaissance platoon (either as
a whole or as teams attached to other platoons) will dictate the scope and extent of the
unit training phase detailed by Cunniffe (1997).
3. Lateral Coordination Mechanisms
The platoon commander and platoon sergeant serve as informal liaison officers in
their capacity as unit leaders. While this alternative solution relieves 1 st CEB of directly
supporting the close and deep engineer reconnaissance mission requirements, they
continue to support it indirectly by providing the Division Reconnaissance Company with
trained engineers via the Sapper Leader Course. Thus the platoon commander and
platoon sergeant serve as lateral coordination links with 1
st CEB for personnel and
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procedural issues related to engineer reconnaissance, and coordinate with 1 s,/3 rd LAR
Battalions and other divisional units on operational issues involving engineer
reconnaissance.
Course Name Number per Platoon
Basic Reconnaissance Course All Members
USMC Combatant Dive School 15 (including Pit Cmdr, Pit Sgt, Equipment NCO)
Survival Evasion Resist Escape
(SERE) School 6 (2 per team)
HRST Master 3 (including Pit Cmdr, Pit Sgt, Equipment NCO)
Helocast Master 3 (Pit Cmdr, Pit Sgt, Equipment NCO)
Dive Supervisor Course 2
HMMWV/Ammunition Driver 3 (1 per team)
Soils Analysis Course 3 (1 per team)
Special Forces Engineer NCO As Available
Ranger School As Available
Mountain Leaders Course As Available
Table 4.4. Individual Training Phase School Requirements for Division Reconnaissance
Company Engineer Reconnaissance Platoon (After Cunniffe, Enclosure 3,
1997).
D. ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY IN A LIGHT ARMORED
RAIDER BATTALION
This alternative solution stems from a concept paper by Feldmeier and Yunker
(1996) that redesigns the current LAR battalions as "Raider Battalions." The Raider
Battalion is a ". . .wheeled combined arms force that is designed to make deep
penetrations to address operational objectives... "(Feldmeir and Yunker, p. 46, 1996).
One of this conceptual battalions missions is to "...identify surfaces and gaps at the
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boundary and beyond the tactical area of influence" (Feldmeir and Yunker, p. 46, 1 996),
which inherently involves many aspects of engineer reconnaissance. To this end, the
authors include a combat engineer platoon in the battalions task organization to provide
the battalion with engineer reconnaissance, mobility/countermobility, and demolition
capabilities. This develops an engineer reconnaissance core competency in the Raider
Battalions capable of conducting close and deep engineer reconnaissance missions. This
alternative also removes 1
st CEB from executing close and deep engineer reconnaissance
missions and internalizes most coordination requirements within the Raider Battalion.
This concept maintains the existing LAR battalions basic center of gravity but involves
diversifying into several related specialties, one of which is engineer reconnaissance.
This concept groups individuals by combat engineer and light armored reconnaissance
functions within the platoon. The basis for grouping the platoon into the Raider Battalion,
however, is less clear. Mission related process interdependencies between the engineer
platoon and other elements of the Raider Battalion organization suggest that the
battalion's subordinate elements are grouped by market (or the process by which the
organization accomplishes its mission).
The organizations mobility requirements and fairly autonomous method of
operation involve significant quantities of personnel and equipment. The following
sections outline these structural requirements, as well as briefly address anticipated
training needs and lateral coordination concerns.
1. Personnel Requirements
Feldmeir and Yunker suggest a reinforced engineer platoon in support of the
conceptual Raider Battalion organization. Table 4.5 lists personnel requirements to man
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Element Quantity Rank MOS Billet
Platoon Capt 1302 Platoon Commander
HQ IstLt 1302 Asst. Platoon Commander
GySgt 1371 Platoon Sergeant
SSgt 1371 Asst. Platoon Sergeant
SSgt 1371 Platoon Guide
Sgt 1371 Asst. Platoon Guide
LCpl-PFC 0313/2147 Vehicle Driver
1" Squad Sgt 0313 Vehicle Commander
Cpl 0313 Vehicle Gunner
LCpl-PFC 0313 Vehicle Driver
Sgt 1371 Squad Leader
Cpl 1371 Team Leader
Cpl-PFC 1371 Combat Engineer
CPL-PFC 1345 Backhoe Operator
HM3-HN 8404 Corpsman
2nd Squad Sgt 0313 Vehicle Commander
Cpl 0313 Vehicle Gunner
LCpl-PFC 0313 Vehicle Driver
Sgt 1371 Squad Leader
Cpl 1371 Team Leader
Cpl-PFC 1371 Combat Engineer
Cpl-PFC 1345 Backhoe Operator
HM3-HN 8404 Corpsman
3
rd Squad Sgt 0313 Vehicle Commander
Cpl 0313 Vehicle Gunner
LCpl-PFC 0313 Vehicle Driver
Sgt 1371 Squad Leader
2 Cpl 1371 Team Leader
6 Cpl-PFC 1371 Combat Engineer
Cpl-PFC 1345 Backhoe Operator
—±— HM3-HN 8404 Corpsman
Total = 2/46/3
Table 4.5. Personnel Requirements for Raider Battalion Engineer Platoon (After
Feldmeir and Yunker, pg. 26, 1996).
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this platoon. This task organization boasts relatively senior leadership for a platoon, with
a captain filling what is normally considered a lieutenants billet. The additional officer
and three SNCOs in the platoon headquarters provide the organization with the requisite
knowledge, leadership, and maturity for deep operations. Of note is that only 36 of the
total 5 1 personnel in this proposed task organization are combat engineers, with light
armored infantrymen and corpsmen comprising the remaining 15 personnel. This
generates additional potential training requirements for combat engineers to operate
effectively with their light armor counterparts.
2. Training Requirements
Feldmeir and Yunker do not address training for combat engineers assigned to a
Raider Battalion. Their reconnaissance oriented mission suggests these engineers all
attend the Sapper Leader Course, while their light armored mode of transportation
suggests they attend a light armored scout course taught internally by the Raider
Battalion. The platoon leadership should attend the LAV Leaders Course to develop
proficiency in planning and conducting light armored operations. This mix of training
provides a base standardization of skills both within the platoon and between the platoon
and the other elements of the Raider Battalion. Table 4.6 lists training requirements by
schools and quotas that are in addition to basic MOS training. The platoon leadership
would attend additional light armored tactical, vehicle, or maintenance related training as





Light Armored Scout Course
LAV Leaders Course
9 (All Engineer Squad Members)
9 (All Engineer Squad Members)
6 (Pit Cmdr through Asst. Pit Guide)
Table 4.6. Raider Battalion Engineer Platoon Training Requirements.
3. Equipment Requirements
The Raider Battalion concept mounts the engineer platoon on a mix of three LAV
Engineer variants and three LAV Dual GAU-19 variants to provide a balanced
combination of mobility, hauling capacity and firepower. While this appears to be an
ideal method of transporting engineers on the battlefield, both of these variants are
conceptual and would require extensive modification of the existing LAV Logistics or
LAV 25 variants prior to forming this organization. The platoon also requires an
assortment ofcommon engineer demolition kits, hand tools, mine detectors, and various
other equipment items found in a combat engineer platoons table of equipment.
4. Lateral Coordination Requirements
This alternative minimizes lateral coordination requirements between 1 st CEB and
the Raider Battalion by virtue of consolidating the close and deep engineer
reconnaissance responsibilities in one organization. Direct contact between the Raider
Battalion engineer platoon leaders and 1 st CEB must still occur, however, to coordinate
training of Raider engineers and ensure currency in engineer reconnaissance procedures
and requirements. The fairly large Raider engineer platoon headquarters is more than
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sufficient in terms of experience, knowledge, and manpower to effectively coordinate
with 1 st CEB on such issues.
E. DEVELOPING AN ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY
THROUGH CROSS TRAINING
This alternative requires no structural modification to any divisional
reconnaissance organization, but relies on cross training between existing organizations
to develop an engineer reconnaissance capability. It allows each organization to maintain
its center of gravity with minimal diversification beyond that inherent to current task
organization doctrine. This alternative posits that 1 st CEB supports the close and deep
engineer reconnaissance missions by attaching trained combat engineers to either a LAR
battalion or the Division Reconnaissance Company. Rather than developing a formal
engineer reconnaissance element within 1 st CEB, however, engineers from line
companies cross train with the LAR battalions while engineers assigned to MEU platoons
cross train with MEU platoons from the Division Reconnaissance Company. This cross
training develops a degree of skill standardization for close and deep engineer
reconnaissance missions between operators at each organization. Individuals are grouped
into existing organizations by their traditional MOS function (engineering, armored
reconnaissance, and amphibious/stealth reconnaissance) for administrative and training
purposes. During periods of cross training or attachment for operational requirements,
elements of these organizations are grouped by market due to the interdependence created
between organizations by the engineer reconnaissance function. Figure 4.3 illustrates the
cross training relationships between reconnaissance organizations. This alternative relies
heavily on direct contact and liaison mechanisms for lateral coordination between
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organizations to conduct effective training and develop a viable engineer reconnaissance
capability. The following sections address training relationships, training and time
requirements, and coordination mechanisms.
1. Cross Training with MEU Platoons
Smith (1997) suggests that the division can develop a solid close and deep
engineer reconnaissance capability by initiating a cross training program between
Division Reconnaissance Company and 1 st CEB MEU platoons during pre-deployment












Figure 4.3. Cross Training Relationships for Engineer Reconnaissance.
training phases. These phases normally consist of a three to six month period of training
conducted under the auspices of 1 st CEB and the Division Reconnaissance Company,
followed by a six month period of training with the Battalion I anding Team (BLT) and
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MEU. The engineer and reconnaissance platoons could participate in mutually
complementary training events currently conducted independently. Specifically, these
are portions of 1 st CEBs four week Sapper Leader Course, and the Division
Reconnaissance Company's one week amphibious training package and two week
platoon patrolling package. Reconnaissance Marines participating in the Sapper Leader
Course benefit from advanced demolitions training and an introduction to engineer
reconnaissance, while combat engineers attending the patrolling and amphibious training
packages benefit from exposure to specific skills, techniques and SOPs related to
amphibious and stealth reconnaissance operations. This alternative results in an initial
time investment of four to six weeks with each platoon hosting the other for
approximately two to three weeks of focused training. Once a MEU forms, the engineer
and reconnaissance platoons will have a basis for continued joint training during the six-
month MEU work-up training cycle to polish an engineer reconnaissance capability. As
Cunniffe states, reconnaissance platoon "...training opportunities with the Battalion's
infantry companies and attachments should be exploited to the maximum extent possible"
(Cunniffe, 1997).
Although a MEU is operationally and administratively detached from the
division, the relationships and capabilities formed during MEU training and deployments
should directly carry over to support the division reconnaissance function. This
alternative is supported by one of the divisions top priorities: forming and preparing
BLTs and their attachments for service with the MEUs (Libutti, 1994). While this cross
training supports engineer aspects of amphibious and stealth reconnaissance, cross
training with LAR battalions supports engineer aspects of armored reconnaissance.
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2. Cross Training With LAR Battalions
Gallagher (1997) suggests that combat engineers cross training with LAR
battalion scouts will improve the divisions close and deep engineer reconnaissance
capability. He promotes LAR scouts attending 1 st CEBs Sapper Leader Course to
develop a baseline of knowledge and skill levels required for engineer reconnaissance
missions, followed by increased cross-training with combat engineers from 1 st CEB line
companies during normal unit training and scheduled exercises. The resulting habitual
working relationship between the engineer and LAR communities strengthens the process
interdependence and minimizes task uncertainty between the two organizations for
conducting close and deep engineer reconnaissance from an armored platform. This
armored engineer reconnaissance capability complements the previously discussed
amphibious and stealth engineer reconnaissance capability to provide the division with an
engineer reconnaissance capability across the division's operational spectrum.
3. Lateral Coordination Mechanisms
This alternative exercises both direct leader contact and the LAR battalion
engineer liaison officer positions to coordinate effective cross training between 1 st CEB
and the LAR battalions. Lacking a formal engineer liaison position at the Division
Reconnaissance Company, a temporary task force of personnel from 1 st CEB and the
Division Reconnaissance Company could form to develop and coordinate cross training
processes between the MEU platoons. Once the training plan is established, direct




This chapter identified and discussed four alternative methods of developing an
engineer reconnaissance capability in 1 st Marine Division. Table 4.7 summarizes the four
alternatives in terms of:
1
.
The organization(s) that contains the engineer reconnaissance capability and
any related diversification involved.
2. Number of personnel (Marine officer/Marine enlisted/Navy enlisted) required
to develop new structure (if any) within the organization(s).
3. Relative degree and type of additional training required to develop this
capability.
4. Relative degree and type of mechanisms used to insure lateral coordination
between organizations.
Having identified these four alternatives, Chapter V provides a cost and benefit
analysis of these alternatives and ranks them by their cost/benefit ratios.
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Capable Personnel
Organ ization(s)/ Required Lateral
Diversification for New Degree and Type of Coordination
Alternative Involved Structure Training Required Mechanisms
1
st CEB Engineer • I s* CEB 0/15/1 • Significant use of Significant use of
Recon Section
• Diversifies into
formal schools • Direct contact
reconnaissance • Regular follow- • Liaison







Division • Division 1/21/1 • Significant use of Minimal use of



















Cross Training • Primary capability 0/0/0 • Minimal use of Extensive use of
Between Existing with 1
st CEB formal schools • Direct contact
Organizations
• Shared with LAR, • Maximum use of • Liaison
DivRecCo cross training officers
• 1
st CEB diversifies Initial use of







Table 4.7. Summary of Four Alternative Solutions.
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V. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter evaluates the alternative solutions presented in Chapter IV to
determine the best solution to the engineer reconnaissance problem. The chapter
develops criteria for use in an additive weighting and ranking method of cost/benefit
analysis to determine each solution's cost/benefit ratio. An ordinal ranking of these ratios
provides a relative ranking of the alternative solutions, with the optimal solution having
the lowest ratio value.
B. ANALYSIS CRITERIA IDENTIFICATION
This section identifies cost and benefit criteria to measure each alternative
solution against the others. Criteria were selected based on the ability to measure them
either qualitatively or quantitatively as well as their applicability to the engineer
reconnaissance problem and each alternative solution.
1. Cost Criteria
Chapter IV described each alternative solution in terms of personnel and training
requirements for the specific organizations involved. These translate into measurable
"costs" for the division and its subordinate reconnaissance organizations. The third cost
criterion is the degree of lateral coordination each alternative requires and involves a
more subjective approach for measurement and comparison purposes.
a. Personnel Requirements
This criterion measures the relative number of personnel required for any
new structure added to a reconnaissance organization. As stated in Chapter I, this thesis
assumes that personnel structure in the Marine Corps and 1 st Marine Division is a "'zero-
55
sum game" and personnel additions to one or more organizations necessarily require
equal personnel reductions from other organizations. This assumption applies to intra-
organizational personnel issues, as well. Therefore, an alternative that requires more
personnel relative to other alternatives will incur a greater "cost" to the organization(s)
involved.
b. Training Requirements
This criterion measures the relative amount of formal school training,
cross training, and sustainment training required by an alternative. Training is also a
"zero-sum game" in terms of time and resources required, both of which are finite and
relatively fixed in quantity. Therefore, an alternative that requires more training relative
to other alternatives will incur a greater "cost" to the organization(s) involved.
c. Lateral Coordination Requirements
This criterion measures the relative amount of lateral coordination
required by an alternative. Lateral coordination has time and personnel components, and
may be complicated by location. The variability of these factors make lateral
coordination requirements more difficult to measure from a purely objective standpoint
and require a large degree of subjectivity to compare alternatives in terms of these
requirements. Similar to personnel and training requirements, however, an alternative
that requires more lateral coordination relative to other alternatives will incur a greater
"cost" to the organization(s) involved. This is particularly true if the alternative




This section establishes four benefit criteria to evaluate the relative benefits of
each alternative solution. These criteria are quality, acceptability, applicability, and
maintainability. The following sub-sections define each criterion and address the
subjective approach to measure each alternative in terms of the specific benefit criterion.
a. Quality
Quality is the degree to which an alternative solution provides a better
quality engineer reconnaissance capability to 1
st
Marine Division. A quality
measurement of engineer reconnaissance focuses on an alternative's ability to collect
required engineer information in a timely manner. The primary factor influencing this is
the degree of expected engineer expertise based on the positioning of the "reconnaissance
engineers" within the division structure relative to 1
st CEB. First Combat Engineer
Battalion is the division's center of gravity for combat engineer knowledge and skill and
should provide the highest quality engineer information. Alternatives that remove the
engineer reconnaissance function from 1 st CEB are expected to provide engineer
information of lower quality due to the reconnaissance engineers separation both
physically and (to varying degrees) professionally from the divisions engineering center
of gravity. Therefore an alternative that retains the engineer reconnaissance function in
1
st CEB will provide the greater quality benefit to the division's reconnaissance function
compared to an alternative that removes the engineer reconnaissance function from 1 st
CEB. Quality measurements for alternatives that separate reconnaissance engineers from
1
st CEB will rely on the seniority of leadership of the engineer reconnaissance element.
Those alternatives that have more senior leadership would be expected to have a more
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developed and diverse body of engineering knowledge and skills and would likely
produce a higher quality engineer reconnaissance product than alternatives with less
experienced leadership.
b. Acceptability
Acceptability is the degree to which an alternative solution interferes with
operations within reconnaissance organizations. This is synonymous with the degree of
negative change the engineer reconnaissance function will introduce to an organizations
current operations. This interference is a subjective measure of the relative degree of
deviation from existing methods and patterns of operations caused by incorporating the
engineer reconnaissance function into one or more organizations. Therefore an
alternative that causes relatively little interference will be considered more acceptable
than an alternative that causes a high degree of interference.
c. Employability
Employability is the degree to which an alternative can be applied in
projected operational environments. This entails a subjective measurement of the
employability of an alternative in amphibious, mechanized, motorized, heliborne and
foot-mobile operations in all conceivable environments. An alternative that is
employable across more of the operational spectrum and in more environments than other
alternatives will provide the division a greater benefit.
d. Maintainability
Maintainability measures the ease of maintaining an engineer
reconnaissance capability once it is established. This involves maintaining both the
engineering skill and knowledge sets as well as the reconnaissance skill and knowledge
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sets required to effectively conduct engineer reconnaissance missions for the division.
This is a subjective measure that involves access to engineer and reconnaissance centers
of gravity, access to training resources, and personnel career pattern issues that enhance
or detract from maintaining engineer reconnaissance skills.
C. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
This thesis analyzes costs and benefits using the additive weighting and ranking
technique. This technique assigns weights between zero and one to criteria according to
their relative degree of importance to the analysis, with the sum of the weights equaling
one. The four alternative solutions under analysis are then ordinally ranked by each cost
or benefit criteria, with the most favorable alternative assigned a value of four and the
least favorable alternative assigned a value of one. Multiplying the criteria weight by the
criteria rank yields a weighted rank for each of the criteria, which are then summed for
each alternative to yield an overall score. For both cost and benefit analyses, the
alternative with the highest overall score is the most favorable while the alternative with
the lowest overall score is the least favorable. This thesis applies this technique first to
evaluate alternatives with respect to cost criteria, and then to evaluate alternatives with
respect to benefit criteria. Dividing each alternatives overall benefit score by its overall
cost score produces a ratio; visual inspection of these ratios identifies the alternative with
the lowest ratio as the most favorable alternative. For ease of discussion, the following
sections will refer to each alternative solution by the following numbering system:
1
.
Engineer reconnaissance section at 1 st CEB.
2. Engineer reconnaissance platoon at Division Reconnaissance
Company.
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3. Engineer platoon in LAV Raider Battalion.
4. Cross training solution.
D. COST ANALYSIS
1. Criteria Weighting
Section B identified four cost criteria for evaluating each alternative solution.
Table 5.1 assigns a weight to each cost criterion based on its relative importance to
overall "cost" to the division or subordinate reconnaissance organizations. The finite
number of personnel available make personnel requirements most costly, followed by
training requirements and lateral coordination requirements.
Cost Criteria Weight Assigned
Personnel Requirements 0.5
Training Requirements 0.3
Lateral Coordination Requirements 0.2
Table 5.1. Cost Criteria Weighting.
2. Ranking Alternatives by Personnel Requirements
Table 5.2 reviews personnel requirements associated with each alternative as
discussed in Chapter IV and summarizes rank scores assigned to each alternative.
Alternative four does not require any additional personnel and incurs the lowest
personnel cost on the division. Accordingly it receives the highest rank score of four.
Alternative one requires a total of 16 personnel (0/15/1) and incurs the next lowest cost
on the division for a rank score of three. Alternative two requires 23 personnel (1/21/1)
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and receives a rank score of two, while alternative three requires 51 personnel (2/46/3)
and receives the lowest rank score of one.
Alternative 1 2 3 4
Personnel
Requirements 0/15/1 1/21/1 2/46/3 0/0/0
Rank Score 3 2 1 4
Table 5.2. Personnel Requirements and Rank Scores per Alternative.
3. Ranking Alternatives by Training Requirements
Table 5.3 reviews training requirements associated with each alternative as
discussed in Chapter IV and summarizes rank scores assigned to each alternative.
Alternative three requires the least amount of formal and cross training outside of the
Raider Battalion organization. It incurs the lowest training "cost" and receives the
highest rank score of four. Alternative one requires slightly more formal school training
and significantly more cross training and receives the next highest rank score of three.
























Rank Score 3 2 4 1
Table 5.3. Training Requirements and Rank Scores per Alternative.
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Alternative two requires a significant amount of formal school and internal unit training,
and receives a rank score of two. Alternative four requires minimal formal school
training but extensive cross training, which is complicated by the complexity of
scheduling effective cross-training between several organizations. It receives the lowest
rank score of one.
4. Ranking Alternatives by Lateral Coordination Requirements
Table 5.4 reviews lateral coordination requirements associated with each
alternative as discussed in Chapter IV and reflects rank scores assigned each alternative.
Alternative three requires a relatively small amount of lateral coordination and receives
Alternative 1 2 3 4
Training Significant use Minimal use of Minimal use of Extensive use
Requirements of of
• Direct • Direct • Direct • Direct
contact contact contact contact





Rank Score 2 3 4 1
Table 5.4. Lateral Coordination Requirements and Rank Scores per Alternative,
the highest rank score of four. Alternative two requires slightly more lateral
coordination via direct contact and liaison officers and receives a rank score of three.
Alternative one requires significant use of direct contact and liaison officers to achieve
lateral coordination and receives a rank score of two. Alternative four requires extensive
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use of direct contact, liaison officers, and possibly a short-term task force to establish
cross training programs. Accordingly, it receives a rank score of one.
5. Additive Weighting and Ranking of Alternatives
Table 5.5 depicts the additive weighting and ranking technique for evaluating the
relative costs of alternative solutions. Based on the given weights for cost evaluation
criteria and the alternative rankings, alternative one incurs the lowest overall cost to the
division in terms of personnel, training, and lateral coordination requirements.
Alternatives three and four incurred relatively equal costs, while alternative two incurred
the greatest cost.
Alternative-^ 1 2 3 4
Cost | Weight Rank WeightedRank Rank WeightedRank Rank WeightedRank Rank WeightedRank
Personnel 0.5 3 1.5 2 1.0 1 0.5 4 2.0
Training 0.3 3 0.9 2 0.6 4 1.2 1 0.3
Lateral
Coordination
0.2 2 0.4 3 0.6 4 0.8 1 0.2
Totals ^ 1.0 Score = 2.8 Score = 2.2 Score = 2.5 Score = 2.5
Table 5.5. Additive Weighting and Ranking of Alternatives by Cost Criteria.
E. BENEFIT ANALYSIS
1. Criteria Weighting
Section B identified four benefit criteria for evaluating each alternative solution.
Table 5.6 assigns weights to each criterion based on its relative importance to the overall
"benefit" realized by the division or its subordinate reconnaissance organizations. Quality
63
and employability are the most important benefits to the division, followed by
maintainability and acceptability. Weights assigned to these criteria are subjectively
based on this hierarchy.





Table 5.6. Benefit Criteria Weighting.
2. Ranking Alternatives by Quality
Table 5.7 summarizes rank scores for quality assigned to each alternative.
Alternative one retains the highest degree of engineer knowledge and skill by virtue of
the engineer reconnaissance sections location in 1 st CEB. This gives alternative one the
best access to the divisions engineering center of gravity, for which it receives the highest
rank score of four.
Alternative 1 2 3 4
Rank Score 4 1 2 3
Table 5.7. Ranking Alternatives by Quality.
Alternative four also retains the engineer reconnaissance function in 1
st CEB but relies on
extensive cross training rather than developing a specific reconnaissance organization
within the battalion. For this reason it receives a rank score of three. Alternatives two
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and three both remove the engineer reconnaissance function from the divisions
engineering center of gravity, but alternative three boasts substantially more senior and
experienced leadership than alternative two. For this reason, alternative three receives a
rank score of two and alternative two a rank score of one.
3. Ranking Alternatives by Employability
Table 5.8 summarizes rank scores for employability assigned to each alternative.
Alternatives one and two are nearly equal in terms of employability across the
operational spectrum in most environments. Alternative two provides a slightly more
employable capability, however, by virtue of its amphibious reconnaissance mission and
capabilities. Alternative two, therefore, receives a rank score of four while alternative one
receives a rank score of three. Alternative three is slightly hampered in employability by
its association with and reliance upon the LAV platform, which tends to limit
employability to motorized/mechanized operations in physical environments that support
wheeled mobility. Alternative four, therefore, receives a rank score of two while
alternative three receives a rank score of one.
Alternative 1 2 3 4
Rank Score 3 4 1 2
Table 5.8. Ranking Alternatives by Employability.
4. Ranking Alternatives by Maintainability
Table 5.9 summarizes maintainability rankings for each alternative. Alternative
one provides excellent access to the engineering center of gravity and does not
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significantly affect current career patterns for combat engineers. Assuming division
support for the concept, it provides good access to reconnaissance centers of gravity
Alternative 1 2 3 4
Rank Score 4 1 2 5
Table 5.9. Ranking Alternatives by Maintainability,
through direct contact and liaison mechanisms. It provides excellent access to 1 st CEB
training resources, and good access to other divisional training assets. For these reasons
it provides the division with the highest level of maintainability and receives a rank score
of four. Alternative four lacks the organizational structure to ensure continued focus on
engineer reconnaissance training with dedicated personnel and assets but retains excellent
access to the engineering center of gravity. It has no major impact on established
engineer career patterns, and assumes good access to training assets and reconnaissance
centers of gravity given a favorable command climate. Alternative four, therefore,
receives a rank score of three. Alternative three boasts excellent access to the armored
reconnaissance center of gravity and should retain good access to the engineering center
of gravity. Expected similarities in missions and METLs between the Raider Engineer
Platoon and a 1 st CEB line company suggest engineers should be able to migrate between
the two communities with little impact on career patterns. This does not hold true to the
same degree between 1 st CEB and the Division Reconnaissance Company, where
engineers assigned to a reconnaissance platoon run a higher risk of being absorbed into
the reconnaissance community. This creates an imbalance in the number of engineers
available to fill engineer line numbers and limits the alternatives maintainability. For this
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reason, alternative three receives a rank score of two while alternative two receives a rank
score of one.
5. Ranking Alternatives by Acceptability
Table 5.10 summarizes acceptability rankings for each alternative. The conceptual
nature of the Raider Battalion allows alternative three to claim the least amount of
interference or change within a reconnaissance organization. It is difficult to interfere
with an organization that exists only on paper or as an ad-hoc version approximated by a
LAR battalion during training exercises. For this reason alternative three receives an
acceptability rank score of four. Alternative one would involve only minimal change to
operations within the S-3 Training section of 1
st CEB and some burden to incorporate
cross training with other reconnaissance organizations. Alternative one, therefore,
receives a rank score of three. Alternative four would create a moderate degree of change
with training schedules for all reconnaissance organizations, while alternative two would
involve a significant degree of change only in the Division Reconnaissance Company's
current operations. This suggests that alternative two receive a rank score of two, and
alternative four a rank score of one.
Alternative 1 2 3 4
Rank Score 3 2 4 1
Table 5.10. Ranking Alternatives by Acceptability.
6. Additive Weighting and Ranking of Alternatives
Table 5.1 1 depicts the additive weighting and ranking technique for evaluating the
relative benefits of alternative solutions. Based on the subjective weights assigned to the
67
benefit criteria and the alternative rankings, alternative one provides the greatest benefit
in terms of quality, employability, maintainability, and acceptability. Alternative four
provided the next greatest degree of benefit, followed by alternatives two and three.
Alternative— 1 2 3 4









Quality 0.3 4 1.2 1 0.3 2 0.6 3 0.9
Employability 0.3 5 0.9 4 1.2 1 0.3 2 0.6
Maintainability 0.25 4 1.0 1 0.25 2 0.5 3 0.75
Acceptability 0.15 3 0.45 2 0.3 4 0.6 1 0.15
Totals
^.
1.0 Score = 3.55 Score = 2.05 Score = 2.0 Score = 2.4
Table 5.1 1. Additive Weighting and Ranking of Alternatives by Benefit Criteria.
F. SELECTION OF OPTIMAL ALTERNATIVE
Table 5.12 summarizes the cost and benefit scores resulting from the additive
weighting and ranking technique used to evaluate each alternative by cost and benefit
criteria. The cost-to-benefit to ratio provides a relative measure of optimality between
the alternatives. Comparison of the cost-to-benefit ratios reveals that alternative one
provides the greatest benefit at the lowest cost, followed by alternatives four, two and
three.
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Alternative 1 2 3 4
Cost Scores 2.8 2.2 2.5 2.5
Benefit Scores 3.55 2.05 2.0 2.4
Cost/Benefit
Ratio
.78 1.07 1.25 1.04
Table 5.12. Cost and Benefit Score Summary.
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter evaluated the relative costs and benefits of each alternative solution
using an additive weighting and ranking technique to identify an optimal solution.
Alternative one, creating an engineer reconnaissance section at 1
st CEB, provided the
greatest benefit at the least cost across the evaluation criteria. The cross training
alternative provided the next most favorable outcome, followed by creating an engineer
reconnaissance platoon at the Division Reconnaissance Company (alternative two) and
the Raider engineer platoon (alternative three). Chapter VI presents some conclusions
and recommendations for implementation and further study.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to identify possible means of improving the
engineer reconnaissance capability of 1 st Marine Division. Based on the alternative
solutions developed and method of analysis, this study concluded that developing an
engineer reconnaissance section at 1
st CEB provides the division with the greatest
engineer reconnaissance benefit at the lowest cost. This alternative is largely in keeping
with current doctrine that assigns the engineer reconnaissance mission to 1 st CEB and
attaches "reconnaissance engineers" to reconnaissance teams from other organizations for
specific missions. It does entail significant enhancements to this doctrinal concept,
however, specifically with the formation of a formal reconnaissance section at 1 st CEB
and the additional training and coordination requirements necessary to ensure
employability across the battlefield and in all operational environments.
Historic precedent and anticipated future mission requirements suggest a valid
need for the division to have this capability. The current focus on tactical mobility and
operational maneuver supports the requirement to maintain a rapidly employable
engineer reconnaissance capability that can provide maneuver commanders with
information necessary to make sound mobility and countermobility decisions. The
environments in which 1 st Marine Division will likely fight vary from the open desert
plains of SWA to the rugged mountains of the Korean Peninsula, each of which poses
unique mobility concerns and opportunities for potential foes to limit our movement.
This capability will enhance the division's ability to retain the mobility initiative, avoid
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enemy surfaces and strike at gaps in offensive operations. When forced to assume a
defensive posture, this capability assists maneuver commanders with siting obstacles
designed to shape enemy actions on the battlefield and determining his offensive
engineering capability.
Some may view engineer reconnaissance teams as discussed in this thesis as an
effort to encroach upon traditional reconnaissance unit missions. As Brabham (1981)
states, however, this is not the intent; "...it should be emphasized that the engineer
reconnaissance team does not duplicate or usurp the mission or functions of the division
reconnaissance battalion. Rather, its role is to augment those elements of vital combat
intelligence information available to the maneuver commander." In this sense, engineer
reconnaissance is aforce multiplier for the division that enhances its ability to operate in
all environments. A small investment in time and resources provides the division with a
significant return in its collection abilities.
B. LIMITATIONS
While this study reached this conclusion through careful analysis of available
information, the following factors and considerations may limit its applicability:
1 . Although significant efforts were made to include the views and opinions of
infantry officers serving with or having knowledge of reconnaissance
organizations, this study was prepared from a combat engineer officer's
perspective. Accordingly, it may contain biases with respect to the
importance of engineer reconnaissance and how it should be conducted that
are not shared by others.
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2. The alternative solutions developed are representative of general
organizational and training solutions. Specifically, others reviewing this
research may recommend different personnel, training, and coordination
requirements based on their perspective of mission requirements and the
organizational needs of 1 st Marine Division.
3. This thesis did not investigate specific table of equipment requirements and
costs associated with each alternative. These would range from substantial for
the Raider battalion alternative to minimal for the cross training alternative.
While these would obviously have a large impact on alternative selection, they
were beyond the scope of this thesis's treatment of the organizational design
problem.
4. While the division's current formal reconnaissance function is decentralized
among four primary organizations, the ongoing efforts to restructure the
reconnaissance community may result in centralizing all reconnaissance
functions in one organization within the division. Whether by design or
through omission, current literature on this does not address inclusion of
engineer reconnaissance with centralization of other reconnaissance functions.
Further consideration of the relationship between engineer and other forms of




1. Recommendations for Further Action
In addition to implementing the engineer reconnaissance section alternative, the
following actions are recommended:
1
.
Convene a panel of combat engineer and infantry specialists (officer and
enlisted) with expertise or interest in reconnaissance operations to review the
relationship and required linkages between engineer reconnaissance and other
types of reconnaissance conducted within the division.
2. Allocate quotas for the Basic Reconnaissance Course and other formal
reconnaissance-related schools to 1
st CEB to improve the ability of combat
engineers to integrate with reconnaissance organizations when required.
3. Once this capability is established, incorporate engineer reconnaissance
"play" into unit training and major exercises to realistically exercise this
capability and prove its value to maneuver commanders.
2. Recommendations for Further Study
The following areas are recommended for further study:
1
.
Exploring the role of engineer reconnaissance in the very shallow water
environment, particularly with respect to fixed and explosive obstacles
associated with anti-landing defenses.
2. Study the requirement for and current effectiveness of engineer
reconnaissance in FSSG and ACE engineer units, and what benefits (if any)
cross training with division engineer reconnaissance teams may yield.
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